



Top Secret



HR

25X1



STAFF NOTES:

East Asia


State Department review completed

Top Secret

185

25X1

December 2, 1975



25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002300060001-1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002300060001-1

EAST ASIA

25X1

CONTENTS

December 2, 1975

Japan's Left Wing Changes Its
Tune on the Security Treaty. 1

Cambodia: The Sihanouk Road Show, or If
It's Tuesday, This Must Be Mogadiscio. 10

Papua New Guinea: Bougainville
Three Months After 12

25X1

Japan's Left Wing Changes Its
Tune on the Security Treaty

25X1

Three of Japan's four opposition parties are muting their resistance to Tokyo's mutual security treaty with the US.

Early last month a widely publicized policy symposium of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) recommended that the party support the treaty and the presence of US troops in Japan, at least "for the time being." The DSP, the smallest opposition party, may well calculate that the shift will improve its election fortunes as well as its prospects for a coalition with the ruling Liberal Democrats--if that party should split or lose its majority in the Diet.

The DSP decision reflects the view of other opposition parties, including the Socialist and Clean Government party, that there are few political benefits in continuing the militant anti-treaty campaigns of years past. Despite a sympathetic press and the well-known pacifist strain in Japanese public opinion, the opposition parties have made little headway in their 25-year-long effort to end the mutual security treaty and remove US bases from Japan. Still, they have used the issue with some success to harass the ruling conservatives, compelling the government over the years to approach even minor treaty-related questions cautiously.

The issue has been particularly unproductive since the early 1970s. The reversion of Okinawa--the site of the largest US bases--removed a major problem, while the end of US involvement in Indochina took the wind out of opposition claims that Japan might become militarily involved because it housed major US bases.

December 2, 1975

But most important, the rapprochement between Washington and Peking markedly diminished concern that the treaty was an impediment to improved relations between Japan and China. Since 1971, the era of Asian detente--when even Peking seems comfortable with Tokyo's US connection--has called for some significant adjustments in the policies as well as the tactics of the opposition parties.

The DSP: Coalition Calculations

As the opposition camp's right wing, the DSP has long regarded itself as the leading candidate for coalition with the Liberal Democrats should the conservatives lose their majority in the Diet. Party leaders believe that their shift on the treaty--if it becomes official--will remove a major barrier to such an alignment.

The DSP's last attempt at coalition politics occurred in November 1974 when the Liberal Democrats came close to an open split in choosing a successor to prime minister Tanaka. DSP initiatives at the time were tentative at best; former party secretary general Sasaki and party chairman Kasuga reportedly approached a number of conservative leaders--including Takeo Miki--and also explored the idea with the other opposition parties. The compromise selection of Miki as prime minister by the conservatives aborted the inter-party talks.

Nevertheless, the ruling party's internal problems a year ago encouraged the DSP leadership, and they may well believe that the still delicate factional balance in the Liberal Democratic Party continues to offer some leverage. The DSP broke ranks with other opposition parties by officially endorsing the idea of coalition with the conservatives at its convention in February. Their shift on the treaty now places them substantially in step with government policy on Japan's most basic diplomatic linkage.

December 2, 1975

The DSP is moving toward a closer relationship with the conservatives for a variety of reasons. The party has long been uneasy about the more radical stance of its sometime allies on the left--a discomfort that has grown proportionally with the rise in Communist Party strength and the expanding influence within the Socialist Party of the JSP's militant left wing. Moreover, as an opposition party, DSP fortunes have been slipping at the polls; it lost substantially in the 1972 lower house election and since then has made lackluster showings in upper house and local election contests. The party may well hope that highlighting its position as the opposition group most likely to enter the government will help win votes.

Other Opposition: Looking for Flexibility

Both the Socialists, the leading opposition party, and the Clean Government party have moved toward a more flexible position on the treaty, albeit by no means abandoning their opposition.

Speaking before a party anniversary ceremony last month, JSP chairman Narita indicated that, while the JSP would maintain the principle of opposing the treaty, party members should turn their energies to more pressing domestic problems. The JSP, moreover, has already inaugurated a new approach toward ties with the US. The party's first delegation in 18 years visited Washington in September, and party leaders emphasize they expect the contacts to continue. For its part, the Clean Government party has set aside its call for immediate abrogation of the treaty and returned to its earlier position in favor of replacing the treaty with a negotiated treaty of peace and friendship.

Neither party is likely to return to its old militancy. Their efforts--along with the Communist Party--to mount a major anti-US base campaign last

December 2, 1975

year on the eve of President Ford's visit failed badly, and the parties recognize that for the immediate future the public will remain preoccupied with inflation and recession.

Since last summer, moreover, the government has attempted to foster a more rational public discussion of Japan's security policies, and the opposition may calculate that a more responsible participation in the debate will work to their advantage. the possibility, for example, of a united front campaign by the left--calling for a negotiated end to the security treaty and its replacement by a peace and friendship treaty, presumably linked to similar pacts with China and the Soviet Union--could well pose far more problems for detente-minded conservatives than the strident treaty protests of the past.

The Socialist and the Clean Government parties --along with the Communists--can still be expected to belabor the government occasionally with such treaty related issues as pollution or crime around American bases. Overall, however, the frequency and intensity of anti-treaty efforts will probably diminish. It is unlikely that the opposition now sees any real advantages--or a receptive public mood--that would warrant a return to their old-time anti-treaty posture.

25X1

December 2, 1975

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002300060001-1

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002300060001-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002300060001-1

Cambodia: The Sihanouk Road Show, or,
If It's Tuesday, This Must Be Mogadiscio

25X1

Prince Sihanouk is currently in Somalia midway through a tour of the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe that is designed to heighten Cambodia's image among Third World countries and focus attention on the Khmer communist victory.

25X1

25X1

Thus far, Sihanouk and his delegation, including Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak and alternate member of the National United Front Politburo Keat Chhon, have acted primarily as goodwill emissaries, and little of substance appears to have resulted from talks with officials in Baghdad, Damascus, Khartoum, and Sana. The joint statements issued after each visit have followed predictably the Prince's UN speech in early October--denouncing Zionist "aggression," expressing support for Palestinian claims and offering encouragement to liberation movements in South Africa and Rhodesia. No new agreements, such as trade or aid arrangements, have been announced, although the joint communique with the Sudan indicated that the two sides had "exchanged views" on trade and cultural relations and had agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. The Cambodians have otherwise been busy with banquets and sightseeing. In Syria, for example, Sihanouk received a medal and toured the Golan Heights and the Euphrates dam with the interior minister.

25X1

December 2, 1975

-10-

25X1


Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002300060001-1



25X1

Assuming that the Prince's current trip is satisfactory to Phnom Penh, the Khmer communists may use Sihanouk's public relations talents in the future.

25X1



25X1

December 2, 1975

25X1 Papua New Guinea: Bougainville Three Months After

Separatists on the copper-rich island of Bougainville have done little to solidify their claim to independence since their declaration three months ago. The situation in Bougainville remains tense but generally quiet. Police of the central government remain in low profile but move out cautiously to calm occasional incidents.


Nevertheless, the failure of the central government to respond promptly to the challenge to its authority works to the advantage of the separatists. A high-level Papua New Guinea cabinet official told the US ambassador that he was dismayed at Port Moresby's lack of focus on the situation, and claimed that this disinterest is eroding the central government's position in Bougainville. He feels that the government's failure to take strong action will lead in time to an irreversible drift.

There are differences in resolve among the separatist leaders. Father John Momis, chairman of the avowed "Republic of the North Solomons," and Alexis Sarei, head of the "republic's" administrative services, are inclined to be conciliatory toward Port Moresby. They are dominated, however, by leading militant Leo Hannett, who has rejected Prime Minister Somare's offer of talks and who has a large following among Bougainvilleans.

The separatists appear undeterred by the lack of international recognition. An appeal to the UN fell on deaf ears. The separatists appear to have adequate funds from payoffs by local businessmen despite their inability to tap the coffers of the giant Bougainville Copper Limited. A rebel demand that the copper combine pay all taxes to the movement was rejected by the mine management, which then passed its annual payment on to the central government. Another payment is not due for twelve months.

December 2, 1975

25X1



25X6

Port Moresby authorities are also disturbed by the ambivalent attitude of the neighboring British Solomon Islands, which they see as amounting to tacit support for the separatists. Although the Solomons administration has rejected the idea advanced by some separatists of a union between Bougainville and the ethnically similar Solomons, it nevertheless permits leading separatists to use the Solomons as a forum for publicizing their movement.

Bougainville's disaffection typifies the ethnic and tribal differences that plague Papua New Guinea as it tries to make a go at nationhood. If the Bougainvilleans are allowed to have their way, Port Moresby may be faced with shows of independence by other disaffected groups.

25X1

25X1

December 2, 1975

25X1

25X1

Top Secret



Top Secret